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Abstract — The challenge in engaging malware activities 
involves the correct identification and classification of different 
malware variants. Various malwares incorporate code obfuscation 
methods that alters their code signatures effectively countering anti-
malware detection techniques utilizing static methods and signature 
database. In this study, we utilized an approach of converting a 
malware binary into an image and use Random Forest to classify 
various malware families. The resulting accuracy of 0.9562 exhibits 
the effectivess of the method in detecting malware. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cybercrime operations through networked computer 
systems remains a growing threat for developed regions with a 
mature information and communications (ICT) infrastructure in 
which a considerable number of public and private services are 
dependent. At the core of Cybercrime operations are Malwares 
consisting of spywares, bots, rootkits, Trojan, and viruses 
designed to perform tasks such as service disruption, network 
hijacking, exploiting resources, and private information stealing 
[1].  
The challenge in engaging malware activities involves the 
correct identification and classification of different malware 
variants. Malwares incorporate code obfuscation and 
metamorphism to change their code signatures while 
maintaining their behaviors and functionalities [2]. These 
methods effectively counters anti-malware software relying on 
malware signature database to identify a specific malware 
attacking a computer system.  Lastly, this code obfuscation and 
morphing generates a high volume of data points for a certain 
malware variant alone [3].   
  Nataraj et al [4] proposed a method on visualizing malware 
binaries as image file resulting on complex visual patterns acting 
as a malwares signature. The obfuscation of the code also 
introduces various changes on the resulting image but still retain 
the general structure and thus show potential as an approach to 
classifying malware variants.  
 In this study, we take advantage of malware as image files as 
feature vectors and Random Forest to effectively classify and 
segregate malware families from each other. 
II.  DATASET 
In this study we evaluate our methods on the Malimg Dataset 
[4] consisting of 9,342 malware samples of 25 different malware 
families. Table 1 shows the malware families consisting the 
Malimg Dataset and the equivalent population % of each of the 
families within the data set. It is worth noting that the following 
dataset is imbalanced and developing a training set must include 
a stratified sampling of the populations to prevent overfitting and 
under generalization on specific malware variants. 
 
Table 1: Malimg Dataset 
No. Family Family Name 
No. of 
Variants 
Population 
% 
1 Worm Allaple.L 1591 0.17 
2 Worm Allaple.A 2949 0.316 
3 Worm Yuner.A 800 0.086 
4 PWS Lolyda.AA 1 213 0.023 
5 PWS Lolyda.AA 2 184 0.02 
6 PWS Lolyda.AA 3 123 0.013 
7 Trojan C2Lop.P 146 0.016 
8 Trojan C2Lop.gen!G 200 0.021 
9 Dialer Instantaccess 431 0.046 
10 
Trojan 
Downloader 
Swizzor.gen!I 132 0.014 
11 
Trojan 
Downloader 
Swizzor.gen!E 128 0.014 
12 Worm VB.AT 408 0.044 
13 Rogue Fakerean 381 0.041 
14 Trojan Alueron.gen!J 198 0.021 
15 Trojan Malex.gen!J 136 0.015 
16 PWS Lolyda.AT 159 0.017 
17 Dialer Adialer.C 125 0.013 
18 
Trojan 
Downloader 
Wintrim.BX 97 0.01 
19 Dialer Dialplatform.B 177 0.019 
20 
Trojan 
Downloader 
Dontovo.A 162 0.017 
21 
Trojan 
Downloader 
Obfuscator.AD 142 0.015 
22 Backdoor Agent.FYI 116 0.012 
23 Worm:AutoIT Autorun.K 106 0.011 
24 Backdoor Rbot!gen 158 0.017 
25 Trojan Skintrim.N 80 0.009 
 
Table I: Malware families comprising the Malimg Dataset. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Preparation 
 Malware binaries sequences are grouped as 8-bit vectors. 
The resulting 8-bit vectors are then plotted as a grayscale image 
as shown on Fig 1.   
 
    The conversion result of the malware binaries consists of 
images with different sizes and patterns as shown on Fig 2. It is 
also worth noting that several malware creators also add extra 
binary code pattern to their malware as a personal signature 
such as the bottom part of the image shown in Fig 2.C 
 
 
    The malware images are resized into a 2-dimensional matrix 
to have a uniform dataset. The resized images are flattened into 
n x n array where n = 32. Each resulting array with length of 
1024 is labelled with its corresponding malware family. 
 
 The labeled arrays are appended together as a row into a csv 
file that would comprise the training set for the machine learning 
algorithm. 
 
B. Classification 
Various researches on malware and cyber anomaly 
detections utilized machine learning methods such as Support 
Vector Machines (SVM), K-Nearest Neighbors (K-NN), and 
Neural Networks (NN) [6], for this study, we utilized the use of 
Random Forest as a feasible method for malware classification.  
 
In terms of supervised  learning and performances various 
studies have ranked Gradient Boosted Trees, Random Forests, 
Neural Networks, and Support Vector Machines to have high 
predictive accuracies [7][8]. While Gradient Boosted Trees did 
have the highest accuracy, Random Forest was able to achieve 
almost the same performance with minor parameter tuning [7]. 
 
In this study, we utilized the Random Forest implementation 
on R with the randomForest and caret library.  
 
C. Training and Validation 
Creating the training and testing set involves splitting the 
data into 80% training and 20% testing. The splitting of the 
dataset also involves taking into account the relative 
populations of each malware families to ensure that each family 
are well represented on the split dataset. 
 
A k-fold Cross-Validation procedure is used to evaluate the 
model where the training data is randomly partition into 
different subsamples with equal k sizes. One k subsample is 
held out as validation data and the remaining k subsamples are 
used as training data. This process is then repeated k-times 
(referred as the number of folds) with each of the k subsample 
used as validation. The resulting accuracies for each fold is 
averaged to produce a single estimation of the models accuracy 
for a particular machine learning problem [9]. 
 
     A 10-fold Cross-Validation procedure performed on the 
training set to evaluate the model, afterwards the model is tested 
on the held-out testing set and evaluated for its performance. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
    The training set for the data consist of a 1024 feature vector 
with a corresponding label.  We first evaluate the cross-
validation results of the model with the training set.  
 
      
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conversion of Malware binaries into gray scale images. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Resulting Malware images from the binary files. The following 
families above are: A) Adialer.C B) Malex.gen!J, C) Fakerean.  
 
Figure 3: Conversion of an n x n image matrix into a flat array. 
Table 2: Cross Validation Result 
Accuracy Kappa Accuracy Lower Accuracy Upper 
0.9464 0.9367 0.9411 0.9514 
Table 2: Summary of the 10-Fold Cross Validation accuracy metrics 
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     The resulting metrics as shown on Table 2 indicates a strong 
predictive performance from the model. The model’s overall 
predictive accuracy is 0.9464 within the bounds of [0.9411, 
0.9514].  Another metric considered is the Kappa statistic which 
indicates if the proximity of the instances classified by the 
predictive model matched the testing data’s ground truth [10]. 
 
     The measured Kappa for the cross validation result is 0.9367 
and provides a strong indication with regards to the accuracy of 
the random forest model for the training set. Fig 4. Illustrates 
the confusion matrix of the cross validation results. Majority of 
the malware families have accuracies in the range of 0.9 and 
above. It is worth noting that 4 malware families 
(CL2OP.gen!g, C2LOP.P, Swizzor.gen!E, Swizzor.gen!I) have 
accuracies that fall below 0.5. 
 
 
     The random forest model is then tested on the held-out 
testing set consisting of the remaining 20% of the data un-seen 
during the training phase of the model. Table 3 summarizes the 
resulting metrics of the model utilizing the testing set. The 
overall accuracy of the model is 0.9526 within the bounds 
within the bounds of [0.9411, 0.9514]. The measured Kappa is 
0.9441 and indicates the predictive strength of the random 
forest model. The testing set results are similar to the results of 
the cross validation. The results exhibit the reliability of cross 
validation in measuring the predictive strength of a model prior 
to testing the model to an unseen data. 
 
 
 
 The confusion matrix as shown on Figure 5. Shows the 
resulting accuracies for each malware families and exhibits the 
same pattern particularly on the 4 malware families 
(CL2OP.gen!g, C2LOP.P, Swizzor.gen!E, Swizzor.gen!I) 
having less than 0.5 accuracy. Furthermore both Fig 4 and Fig 5 
show that CL2OP.gen!g, C2LOP.P, Swizzor.gen!E, and 
Swizzor.gen!I malware families exhibit misclassifications 
between each other. 
 Inspecting the image data for each of the families reveals that 
these malware families exhibit similar visual patterns as shown 
on Fig 6. The visual similarity of the images coupled with the 
image resizing procedure would likely result into a training and 
testing set with similar data points for each of the malware 
families. This visual similarity would likely explain why the 
misclassifications were concentrated on the 4 families as shown 
on the confusion matrices in Fig 4 and Fig 5.  
 
Figure 4:  Cross Validation Confusion Matrix. The figure shows the 
predictive accuracy for each malware families with a score of 0.0 – 1.0 
where 1.0 represents that all samples for the particular family are classified 
correctly. 
Table 3: Held out Testing Set Result 
Accuracy Kappa Accuracy Lower Accuracy Upper 
0.9526 0.9441 0.9420 0.9618 
Table 3: Summary of the testing set accuracy metrics  
 
Figure 5:  Held-out Testing Set Confusion Matrix. The figure shows the 
predictive accuracy for each malware families with a score of 0.0 – 1.0 where 
1.0 represents that all samples for the particular family are classified 
correctly. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this study we exhibited the used of malware images 
as a feature vector for classifying various malware families. 
The study used Random Forest and performed 10-fold Cross 
Validation to determine the predictive strength of the model 
The resulting accuracies have shown that Random Forest 
model achieved a 0.9526 classification accuracy for the given 
malware dataset. However, it is also worth noting that there 
are still things to consider such as misclassification on visually 
similar malware families.  
As recommendation, since the study has used the 
image from the malwares as the only features for the training 
set, future works on the topic can use feature extraction 
utilizing image processing which can provide additional 
insights and better training procedures for the model.  
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Figure 6:  Visual inspection of the malware families of : A) 
CL2OP.gen!g, B) C2LOP.P, C) Swizzor.gen!E, and D)Swizzor.gen!I. 
exhibiting similar visual patterns  
